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Abstract
Using firm-level data for five countries in Latin America, we find a negative and
statistically significant link between social conflict in rural areas and ownership of
mines. We apply an instrumental variables approach and find that this link may be
causal. The instrument employed is altitude of the mine location—which we claim
is uncorrelated with the dependent variable, firm ownership—but is correlated with
social conflict. This variable serves as an ideal instrument, as it complies with the
exclusion restriction. Our results hold to a formal test of changes in specification.
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Introduction
Despite the fact that large investment, foreign or domestic, is an essential economic policy
for countries to grow, sometimes there are disagreements among economic agents that lead to
protracted social conflict. This is particularly true in developing countries, which are precisely the
ones that need investment the most. Furthermore, such conflicts tend to occur with relatively more
frequency in poorer areas, as inhabitants tend to become suspicious on the benefits of such
investments to themselves and to their livelihoods.1 While the reasons and motivations of social
conflict in these areas have been studied relatively extensively (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 1997;
Collier and Hoeffler, 2000), the impact on the incentives to invest, which is the other side of the
same coin, has been rarely studied empirically.
In this paper, we ask whether social conflict in rural areas decreases the likelihood of large
investing in developing countries and, in particular, whether rural conflict in mining areas is
associated with any increase in the likelihood of firm owners to sell, regardless of nationality or
type of firm. As straightforward as this question may be, social scientists have been unable to
disentangle the direction of the actual link between these two variables. On the one hand, it is
reasonable to expect that non-local, large firms will bring their own corporate culture as well as
their own way of doing business and as such may behave in ways that may be perceived as alien
to the local rural areas, which are typically mostly composed by indigenous population. Regardless
of whether this may be true, this may result in an increase in social friction and eventually social
conflict. On the other hand, it is also rather plausible to expect that rural communities with records
of social conflict may have a bearing on the probability of owners to establish business interests

A very recent example is the “Tia Maria” social conflict in Peru, which has been on-going for several years now:
https://www.peruviantimes.com/19/arequipa-governor-defends-tia-maria-mine-protests/31498/
1
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in such problematic areas. This is particularly true in the mining sector where very large initial
investments are required (Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington, 2012).
While both questions are equally important, in this paper we study the specific question
that goes from social conflict in rural areas to ownership. The reason for doing this is that,
according to the conventional wisdom, there is a generalized belief that mining interests in
developing countries are essentially driven by a profit motive and (while mining performance may
be negatively impacted by social conflict in the short run) the profit motive will tend to
predominate—thus, making longer term negative impacts resulting of social conflicts rather
unlikely. In this context, we believe that ownership is a good proxy for long-term commitment,
one that may help reflect whether this is true, which from our perspective makes it interesting
question to pursue. In addition, we believe that this is an important question, as in recent years
there has been massive domestic and foreign investment in mining exploration and exploitation in
many developing countries, which has increased the interaction between firms and remote rural
communities and may have also increased the chance for potential social conflict.
The above is particularly true for Latin America, the geographical focus of this research
and a region with comparative advantage in mining resources and where its mining related
revenues account for a very sizable share of gross domestic product of the region. At the same
time, this is a continent where most mining tends to be done in very poor, rural, and indigenous
areas that are typically located at very high altitude. Latin America has long been recognized as a
region with a strong comparative advantage in natural resources. This, along with the development
of new extractive technologies, a dramatic rise in commodities prices, and a vastly improved legal
regime, has translated into an enormous increase in investment for both mining exploration and
exploitation in the last couple of decades (Bebbington, 2012). As a matter of illustration, in
2

countries such as Bolivia, Chile, and Perú, investment in mining activities easily accounts for
upwards of 40 percent of the total foreign direct investment and about 10 to 15 percent of the
annual gross domestic product. At the same time, however, externalities derived from these
significant capital inflows have increases the likelihood of interaction between the people living
in rural and remote regions where mining properties tend to be located with the large mining
operations, which may increase the potential for social conflict (Bebbington and Bebbington,
2011).
In this paper we use an original database first collected by Haslam and Ary Tanimoune
(2016) for the period 2011–13, which includes 640 geo-located mining properties in five Latin
American countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru, which was complemented
with additional data on social conflicts collected by us. The advantages of these data are that they
cover most of the mining operations in these five countries and provide systematic information at
the firm level, something unusual in the literature where either micro-level work is performed at
the case-study level or empirical systematic work tends to be done at higher aggregations such as
provinces or states.
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief review of the
literature with emphasis on conflicts. This is followed by a description of the data and
methodology. The next section shows our main findings, including a detailed description of the
instrument employed in order to disentangle causality from social conflict to ownership. The final
section summarizes and concludes.
Brief Review of the Literature
While to our knowledge there is no existing research on our question of interest, there is
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some literature on conflict and related socio-economic outcome variables. For instance, Klapper
et al. (2012) find that heterogeneous impacts of conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire may be important by
providing evidence that firms owned by and employing more foreign employees might have been
affected disproportionally in terms of economic performance. These researchers argue that
increasing hostility and differential treatment towards foreigners, as signaled by economic impacts,
might further exacerbate social cohesion.
Similarly, Bellows and Miguel (2009) discuss the impact of civil war on institutions,
politics and social norms in Sierra Leone. They find that individuals whose households directly
experienced more intense war violence are robustly more likely to attend community meetings,
more likely to join local political and community groups, and more likely to vote, which may have
had a bearing on the rapid postwar political and economic recoveries observed in the country after
the civil conflict ended. Along these lines, Jennings and Sanchez-Pages (2017) study the role of
external conflict as a force that can create social capital. They find that the presence of an outside
threat can induce higher levels of social capital either because a protective aspect of social capital
comes into play and/or as a reallocation of investments from private to social capital. Since the
latter social capital is subject to free riding, the threat, by promoting a greater level of social capital,
can be welfare improving. When the threat is severe, social capital and welfare are more likely to
fall and find that an external threat on social capital is stronger in poor countries.
The paper closest to ours is Menon and Sanyal (2007) which analyzes patterns of foreign
direct investment in India. They investigate how labor conflict, credit constraints and indicators of
a state's economic health influence location decisions of foreign firms and account for the possible
endogeneity of labor conflict variables in modeling the location decisions of foreign firms by using
state‐specific fixed effects and find a strong negative impact on foreign investment. However, as
4

it is well known, a weakness of employing state-specific fixed effects is that they do not control
for endogeneity in a convincing manner. In cross-section work what is crucially important from a
methodological perspective is to come up with a credible variable that can be used as an instrument
one that can convincingly comply with the so-called exclusion restriction.
Data and Methodology
We take advantage of the fact that the data we employ are collected at the mining property
level, which helps provide a more accurate empirical picture. As described above, Haslam and Ary
Tanimoune (2016) collected the data around geo-located mining properties. For each set of
property coordinates, they added firm-level economic information, socio-environmental
characteristics of the area around the mining property, socio-economic and demographic data of
the population living near the mining property, and information about firm-community conflicts
at that property. While in theory our data cover the full universe of mining properties in five Latin
American countries namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru, they were further
expanded using additional data that were available via fieldwork. 2 The inclusion of this
complementary information allows for the analysis of the determinants of conflicts at a subnational
level. Overall, the dataset for this paper include 640 geo-located firms at the advance exploration
stage and above, which allows for the construction of good quality series of subnational data. It is
important to mention that these five countries represent the largest mining economies of Latin
America and have attracted the vast majority of foreign mining investment as demonstrated by the
fact that the cases derived from these countries are very well represented in the case study literature
(Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington, 2012). Table 1 provides summary statistics of the variables

2

The original data source is Infomine an industry site that collects data from stock market regulatory flings GIS information,
country surveys, and census data. The data we employ do not include properties at the “raw prospect” or “exploration” phases, only
those at the “advanced exploration” stage or higher.
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employed in this paper. In addition, the variables that capture social conflict measures are manually
constructed by Haslam and Ary Tanimoune (2016) from case summaries and news reports of Latin
American civil society information clearinghouses. The majority of reports come from OCMAL
(Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de America Latina), MAC (Mines and Communities) reports
filed by the Ombudsman’s office. They were further complemented using information retrieved
from available media by us.3 Figure 1 presents the geographical location of conflicts and mining
properties for Latin American countries between 1998 and 2012.4
We sort ownership shares for each mining company and select the owner with the largest
share. While this share might or might not be a controlling one, the behavior of the owner with the
largest number of shares is typically very significant in terms of influence and behavior to the rest
of the shareholders as the largest shareholder is typically considered the lead owner. We use the
share of this first owner as our dependent variable. On the other hand, our social conflict variable
is proxied in three different ways. The first one is by using a simple dummy that accounts for the
presence of social conflict as reported in the media. The second proxy measures duration of conflict
in number of days. Finally, the third measure is a three-category indicator of intensity of the
conflict as it captures the extent to which violence occurred (peaceful, violent but with no people
hurt, and violent with people hurt). Appendix 1 provides the list of variables employed as well as
their corresponding definitions, which include basic firm and property characteristics, socio-

Media include the national newspapers “El Comercio” as well as other important newspapers with large national circulation, in
particular, “Expreso,” “Peru 21” and “La Republica.” We also consider national television networks, which include four private
networks (Frecuencia Latina, Panamericana Television, America Television, and Andina de Television) and the National State
Channel (Radio Television Peruana).
4 As Haslam and Ary Tanimoune (2016) report, 21 percent of mining properties experienced a known conflict. Of the properties
for which no conflict was recorded, 46 percent were open-pit projects, 13 percent were combined open-pit/underground, 31 percent
were underground, and 10 percent were surface mines. Mines that have experienced a known conflict are located at a higher altitude
than mine that have not, respectively averaging 2260 meters above sea level against 1610 meters above sea level. Of the 133 mines
that experienced a “known conflict”, 62.41 percent were majority-owned by foreign capital, in comparison to mines without
conflicts of which 58.38 percent were foreign-owned. In contrast, 9.7 percent of mines without a known conflict were owned by
private companies without any public participation, against 8.27 percent of mines with a known conflict.
3
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environmental and livelihoods characteristics, basic socio-economic, demographic conditions of
the nearby population, and social conflict.
From a methodological perspective, we apply the following reduced form:
Ownershipi = ʎ+Conflicti + Conditionsi + MineTypei +i (1)

where, as described above, Ownership is the share of the individual or entity with largest
ownership share of the mining firm, and Conflict is a variable that captures social conflict
according to the three categories described above namely, presence, duration and intensity. The
vector Conditions includes basic characteristics of the households surrounding the specific mine,
including access to water and sewerage, infant mortality, percentage of native population and basic
age categories. Likewise, MineType is a variable that captures whether mine extraction is
underground or not, as more open types may exacerbate conflict for environmental reasons, while

 is an error term. In addition, all regressions include commodity fixed effects, country fixed
effects, mine-fixed effects and clusters at the mine level.
Whereas linear probability estimates can only detect an association between our variable
of interest and the dependent variable, we also pursue an instrumental variables methodology using
the altitude of the mine as our instrument. Formally, our instrumental variables specification is as
follows:
Ownershipi = ʎ +E[Conflicti|Zi]+ Conditionsi + MineTypei +i (2)
Conflicti = ɖ + ȹZi + ΩConditionsi +ΓMineTypei +ηi (3)

where E[Conflicti|Zi] is the predicted value of the conflict variable and Zi represents the
instrumental variable, namely the altitude in meters.
It is reasonable to expect that when livelihood choices based on agriculture, animal
7

husbandry or aquaculture are severely limited due to arid climates or high altitude, there is less
resistance to mining. On the other hand, and as a matter of opportunity cost, it is reasonable to
expect that the consequences of mine altitude at median or lower altitudes, with relatively abundant
livelihood alternatives should translate in more resistance to mining. Thus, according to this view,
our variable of interest, social conflict, is negatively correlated with the instrument proposed,
altitude. Recent empirical evidence on this regard has been produced by Haslam and Ary
Tanimoune (2016).
In addition, the physiological literature shows that high-altitude environments can be
debilitating as moderate hypoxia may induce substantial alterations in physiological and
psychological parameters. This is translated in adverse changes in mood states, impairment in
mental performance, behavior, and cognitive functioning during altitude exposure (Bahrke and
Shukitt-Hale, 1993). More importantly, it is believed that behavioral impairments caused by ascent
to high altitude may impact judgment as well affected. The adverse behavioral consequences of
hypoxia are dependent on both the level of altitude and the duration at altitude. Some research
indicates that some performance decrements induced by extreme altitudes may persist for up to a
year or longer after individuals return to lower elevations. The neurochemical basis for mood and
performance change, which is linked to behavioral decrements at altitude may be attributable to
changes in neurochemistry (Shukitt-Hale and Lieberman, 1996).
In fact, recent research shows that long-term exposure to high altitude with hypoxia may
lead to impairment on conflict control (Ma et al., 2015). This was tested using treatment and
control groups in which event related potentials were recorded in a flanker task or set of response
inhibition tests used to assess the ability to suppress responses that are inappropriate in a particular
context in order to investigate the influence of high altitude on conflict control in the high-altitude
8

group and the low-altitude group. By doing this, Ma et al. (2015) show cognitive conflict
modulation, which suggests that long-term exposure to high altitude affects conflict control in the
conflict-resolving stage, and that attention resources are decreased to resist the conflict control in
the high-altitude group, which confirms that conflict control may be influenced by long-term
exposure to high altitude (Ma et al., 2015). In summary, previous studies show that significant
correlation between altitude and potential social conflict may be correlated, which is consistent
with the necessary condition that our variable of interest should be correlated with our chosen
instrument.
On the other hand, it is not reasonable to expect that decisions on ownership would be
directly linked with the altitude of the mining property. While both direct and indirect
considerations such as profit, size of the reserve area and type of commodity may be important
factors to proceed with investment and ownership, we believe that altitude is not one of them for
several reasons. First, the technological barriers related to accessing mining areas located at high
altitudes have been overcome to the point where not even the presence of domestic infrastructure
is needed. Second, the marginal cost of accessing locations at high altitudes is negligible given the
vast fixed costs that mining companies have to spend even before breaking ground for the first
time—more so in times of skyrocketing prices, which coincides with our period of study (Haslam
and Ary Tanimoune, 2016). Third, the political and administrative costs associated with obtaining
exploration and exploitation permits are very significant and offer no economies of scale. Fourth,
most of the countries included in this study enjoy some market power in their specific minerals
that they produce and as such, firms interested in doing business may have some difficulties finding
alternative countries with the same geopolitical structure where to invest in the long term.5 This is
5

For instance, while China ranks second in production of copper and silver in the world, it would be unrealistic to consider that
this country would open its barriers to both the domestic and international private firms for investment.
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illustrated by the fact that Latin American countries rank among the top producers of several
minerals in the world. For instance, in 2017 Chile and Peru occupy the first and third positions,
respectively, among top country producers of copper in the world. Similarly, Mexico and Peru
occupy the first and third positions, respectively, among top silver producers in the world. Finally,
Peru is among the top five producing country of gold while Mexico ranks number nine in the
world. In addition, all the five countries considered in this paper also produce very significant
amounts of several other minerals placing them among the top five to top 10 producing countries
of iron ore, tin, aluminum, bauxite and several others (USGS, 2017).
To the extent that our instrument is correlated to our variable of interest but not correlated
to our dependent variable, our identification strategy is a sensible one; something that is supported
by the facts presented above. As such, we are confident that any statistically significant link
between social conflict and ownership may be considered as causal when using an instrumental
variables approach.
Findings
Table 2 shows our main findings employing the full set of controls, fixed effects at the
commodity and country level, as well as the three dependent variables regarding conflict. We find
that all the variables employed in order to capture social conflict yield negative coefficients, which
are all statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Not only is the presence of conflict linked to
a decrease of first majority ownership in Latin American mines, but also the duration of the conflict
as well as its intensity in terms of violence matter and have a detrimental link with ownership.
The presence of a known social conflict reduces the first majority ownership of the mining
operations as much as 12 percent, while an increase in one day of the duration of a conflict diminish
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the majority ownership in 6 percent. The intensity of a conflict also presents a negative impact in
the ownership thus decreasing the biggest owner share in 3 percent when the conflict escalated to
its following category of violence. That is, a violent conflict with no people hurt will reduce the
share in 3 percent compared to a peaceful dispute, while a violent event where people got hurt will
reduce it in 6 percent.
Regarding the set of controls employed, the rate of infant mortality showed a significant
decreasing effect over the first majority ownership of nearly one half of a percentage point in all
the specifications, as long as an underground mine type increases the biggest owner share in
approximately 5 percent for the three regressions. Even though the rest of variables do not show a
significant effect, the percentage of households with no sewerage, the percent of 20-39 population
and the open pit mine type showed a positive coefficient, whereas the share of native population
in the locations of the mine properties revealed a negative coefficient respecting the first majority
of ownership.
Having in mind that these results computed through ordinary least squares can only detect
association between variables and not causality, we present findings using instrumental variables,
too. Table 3 shows the results using an instrumental variables approach, which indeed supports
our causal claim. As described above, we employed the altitude of mine location in meters as our
instrument. We believe that this instrument fulfills the assumptions required by this approach since
altitude may be highly correlated with the presence of conflicts but unlikely that it may be
correlated with ownership by other direct channels, ones that do not go through social conflicts.
The results for the instrumental variables regressions are presented in Table 3. As in the
previous case, we find that our three measures of conflict are negative and statistically significant
at conventional levels. In this regard, the presence of conflict reduces the first majority ownership
11

in 18 percent, an increase in one day in the duration of the dispute diminish this share in almost 10
percent, while an increase in the intensity of the struggle has a declining effect of 6 percent. The
significance levels and sign of the respective control variables have an analogous behavior as the
ordinary least squares estimates. Unsurprisingly, the related coefficients of the instrumented
regression are higher than the ordinary least squares ones, which is quite expected econometrically
as the instrumental variables is essentially capturing a LATE effect. This give support to the idea
that we our finding is, in fact, causal.
Finally, in Table 4 we go a step further and formally test whether our findings are robust
to changes in specification empirical specification by systematically including additional variables
to the specification presented in equation (1). The systematic methodology that we employ follows
Sala-i-Martín (1997). We augment the empirical specifications used in the equation presented in
(a) by using a pool of five ancillary variables from our dataset and add up to two at a time in order
to perform regressions that include all possible combinations of these five additional variables
added in pairs.6
The variable of interest is said to be strongly correlated or robust with the dependent
variables if the weighted cumulative distribution function, cdf (0) is greater than or equal to 0.95.
In the first column of Table 4, we report the non-weighted means. The second column shows the
aggregate cdf (0) under the assumption of non-normality. Finally, the third column presents the
standard error computed from the non-weighted variance estimate for all the regressions and in
both cases, ordinary least squares and instrumental variables. These additional results provide

6

The ancillary variables included are (i) cropland in the vicinity of the mining property up to 25 kilometers; (ii) share of protected
areas of buffer's area that overlaps with a protected area at 25 square kilometers; (iii) share of homes where the predominant
construction material is adobe; (iv) if stockholders are foreign majority: share in capital > 50 = 1, otherwise=0; (v) market
capitalization of the firm in billions of US dollars.
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further support to our main findings above.
Conclusions
Using firm-level data for five countries in Latin America, we find a statistically significant
link between social conflict in rural areas and ownership of mines. We apply an instrumental
variables approach and find that the link appears to be causal, as our instrument, altitude of the
mine location, is uncorrelated with the dependent variable, foreign ownership, although previous
evidence indicates that it is highly correlated with social conflict, thus providing an ideal
instrument as it complies with the exclusion restriction. Our results hold to a formal test of changes
in specification.
From a policy perspective, our paper shows that social conflict can have significant
consequences for future domestic and foreign investment in countries, a crucial finding in the
context of developing countries that constantly seek ways in which to pursue optimal economic
reform. Our paper shows that social conflict may lead to long-term negative consequences in terms
of economic growth.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Dummy Social Conflict

Mean
0.482

Std Dev
0.321

Min
0

Max
1

Conflict Duration

69.35

43.25

1

198

Conflict Severity

1.323

0.242

0

2

Percent HH No Sewerage

0.711

0.147

0

1

Infant Mortality

0.358

0.242

0.165

0.835

Percent Native Population

0.902

0.125

0.795

0.984

Access to Piped Water

0.464

0.363

0

1

Percent 20-39 Pop

0.535

0.261

0453

0.721

Mine Type: Underground

0.352

0.321

0.

1

Active Mine Status

0.957

0.08

0

1

Note: Source: Haslam and Ary Tanimoune (2016) and own data collection.
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Table 2. Social Conflict and Ownership
Dependent Variable:
First Majority Ownership
Presence of Conflict
-11.717***
(3.171)
Duration of Conflict
-5.850***
(1.786)
Intensity of Conflict
-3.292***
(1.106)
Percent HH No Sewerage
0.084
0.090
0.096
(0.067)
(0.067)
(0.070)
Infant Mortality
-0.443**
-0.455**
-0.423**
(0.187)
(0.183)
(0.185)
Percent Native Population
-0.048
-0.047
-0.057
(0.099)
(0.100)
(0.099)
Percent 20-39 Population
0.157
0.155
0.158
(0.228)
(0.228)
(0.230)
Mine Type: Underground
4.514**
4.627**
4.637**
(2.211)
(2.247)
(2.252)
Mine Type: Open Pit
3.219
3.444
3.439
(2.720)
(2.724)
(2.740)
Constant
92.664***
92.324***
90.327***
(9.960)
(9.886)
(10.868)
R-squared
0.119
0.110
0.100
F-test
2.827
2.794
2.509
Observations
363
363
363
Method employed is ordinary least squares. Dependent variable is defined as dummy
equal to one when foreign ownership is greater or equal to 50 percent. (*) Statistically
significant at 10 percent; (**) statistically significant at 5 percent; (***) statistically
significant at 1 percent. All regressions include commodity dummies, country fixed
effects, neighborhood fixed effects and clusters at the neighborhood level. The following
controls are not reported (they are all non-statistically significant): education dummies,
population density and precipitation.
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Table 3. Social Conflict and Ownership: Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable:
First Majority Ownership
Presence of Conflict
-18.333**
(8.551)
Duration of Conflict
-9.823*
(5.399)
Intensity of Conflict
-5.743*
(3.111)
Percent HH No Sewerage
0.163
0.167
0.172
(0.187)
(0.187)
(0.189)
Infant Mortality
-0.653**
-0.655**
-0.712**
(0.287)
(0.288)
(0.301)
Percent Native Population
-0.111
-0.123
-0.128
(0.121)
(0.129)
(0.131)
Percent 20-39 Population
0.457
0.488
0.470
(0.321)
(0.328)
(0.330)
Mine Type: Underground
6.333**
6.743**
6.853**
(2.342)
(2.443)
(2.546)
Mine Type: Open Pit
6.868
6.112
6.086
(4.780)
(4.784)
(4.746)
Constant
91.943***
96.964***
96.397***
(15.195)
(16.426)
(16.148)
R-squared
0.177
0.178
0.169
F-test (Stock-Yogo)
19.164
19.147
19.854
p-value weak instrument
0.95
0.95
0.95
Observations
363
363
363
Instrument is altitude of mine location in meters; Dependent variable is defined as dummy
equal to one when foreign ownership is greater or equal to 50 percent. (*) Statistically
significant at 10 percent; (**) statistically significant at 5 percent; (***) statistically
significant at 1 percent. All regressions include commodity dummies, country fixed effects
and clusters at the community level. The following controls are not reported (they are all
non-statistically significant): education dummies, population density and precipitation.
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Conflict
Type
A. Presence
OLS
Inst. Var.
B. Duration
OLS
Inst. Var.
C. Intensity
OLS
Inst. Var.

Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis
Cumulative
Distribution
Standard
Function (0)
Error

Statistical
Significance

-0.764
-1.142

0.215
0.542

0.945
0.946

-0.638
-0.843

0.178
0.332

0.944
0.952

-0.437
-0.563

0.185
0.311

0.954
0.958

The ancillary variables employed are described in Footnote 5 in the text. The
second column presents the standard deviation of the variable of interest while
the first column shows the cumulative distribution function (0). A variable whose
weighted cdf(0) is larger than 0.95 is significantly correlated with the dependent
variable (i.e. robust) at a 5-percent significance level. This is shown in the third
column. The cdf is computed assuming non-normality of the parameters
estimated. Results are similar if we assume normality, instead. The specification
shown is the same one employed in Table 2 and Table 3.
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Figure 1. Mining Properties and Social Conflict in Latin American (1998-2012)

Source: Haslam and Tanimoune (2016)
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Appendix 1. Definition of Variables

Presence of Conflict

Intensity of Conflict

Duration of Conflict
Mine Type
Altitude
Majority Ownership
State
Commodity
Sewage
Primary education
Secondary education
Post-secondary
education
Active population
Indigenous

Conflict is defined as the moment when the obstacles to collective
action among otherwise unorganized individuals are overcome, and
coalesce in an identifiable group that makes ongoing, public
demands on civil authorities, or the authority-delegate, in many
cases the firm.7 It is measured as one when it is present and zero
otherwise.
Asks about what causes collective action to deteriorate into violent
acts: Under what conditions collective action against mining
emerges? It is measured by the extent to which violence occurred:
peaceful, violent but with no people hurt, and violent with people
hurt, as reported by the media.
Number of days that the conflict lasted from official announcement
to official end as reported by the media.
Underground=1 ; Surface=2 ; Open-Pit/Underground=3 and zero
otherwise
Altitude of localized mine in meters above sea level.
If stockholders are majority: share in capital > 50 = 1, otherwise=0
If there is any State participation in the capital (Foreign-State,
Local-State, State-Foreign, State-Local, State)=1, otherwise=0
Three commodity dummies, gold, silver and copper. The
corresponding commodity is defined as a dummy = 1, otherwise=0
Share of community next to the mining property with absence of
public utilities in particular, sewage system
Share of community located next to mining property with primary
education
Share of community located next to mining property with
secondary education
Share of community located next to mining property with tertiary
education
Share of population aged 20-59 in community located next to
mining property
Share of aboriginal people in community located next to mining
property

Population density at
Density per square kilometer at 25 squares kilometers.
25 km
Precipitation at 25
Total annual amount of precipitation in mm at 25 square kilometers
km
Source: Haslam and Ary Tanimoune (2016) and own data

7

This approach corresponds with the definition of social protest from the contentious politics literature, which underlines the key
features of observable participation of individuals in collective action, claims upon authority that threaten powerful interests, and
publicness (Haslam and Ary Tanoumine, 2016).
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